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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been rising concern about the impact of liberalisation on
universal service in the telecommunications industry. The gradual removal of internal
cross-subsidies as practised in the monopolistic telecom markets has brought about
a rebalancing of telephone tari¤ structures. The opening of the market to competi-
tive forces has forced the alignment of tari¤s with costs. There is concern that the
increase in connection and rental charges, as well as in local call charges, that has
accompanied the fall in long distance and international call prices, may have a neg-
ative impact on the universal a¤ordability of the telephone service. Re‡ecting this
concern, national and European regulatory agencies have emphasized the importance
of maintaining the high, pre-liberalisation standard of universal accessibility and af-
fordability. The general feeling is that measures are needed to avoid the tendency
for lucrative corporate user market bene…ts to be realized at the expense of some
categories of residential customers.
In this article we address three questions. First, what is the impact of access
price variations on residential telephone access in the UK? Second, which socio-
demographic variables in‡uence telephone access beyond the price dimension? And
…nally, are certain socio-demographic groups - low income, the elderly, single mothers
- burdened disproportionately by the rebalancing of prices?
We estimate a telephone access demand model to obtain elasticity measures al-
lowing us to assess the threat of drop-o¤ caused by increased access charges. Earlier
1studies of telephone access demand commonly …nd that demand is quite inelastic
with respect to price. However, small access elasticities for the population at large
might mask much larger values for speci…c groups. Evidence from the US based on
micro-data seems to support this argument. See for instance Cain and Macdonald
(1991). Targeted support programs for these population groups should be consid-
ered to improve their access to the telephone. The identi…cation of characteristics
which make a household more or less likely to have telephone access facilitates the
formulation of targeted subsidy programs. We believe such subsidy programs are
an economically e¢cient tool for maintaining universal service goals and improving
telephone penetration among marginalised population groups.
The main objective of this paper is the estimation of a demand model for tele-
phone access based on UK household data. This objective is motivated by a gap in
the literature. Very little evidence in the UK concentrates on access and few stud-
ies are based on household data. One explanation for the relative lack of evidence
on access demand in the UK compared with North America is the structure of the
telecoms market in Europe. In Europe, the monopolistic provision of telecommu-
nication services was accompanied by a uniform pricing policy which has remained
even after liberalisation e¤orts. This excludes the use of pure cross-section studies
for the purpose of assessing price elasticities (the “North American” model). In order
to estimate the impact of price movements on household access despite this market
organisation, we construct a data set with a repeated cross-section structure. The
estimation method based on pseudo-panels makes it possible to consistently estimate
elasticities from this data. Thus we can model the household decision on telephone
access in a discrete choice framework where the telephone service decision is related
to the cost of connection, household income and a host of other socio-demographic
factors. Our results suggest UK price elasticities lying within the spectrum of results
reported for North America. We also …nd evidence of substantially higher access
elasticities for lower income groups thus con…rming the marked income sensitivity of
access.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief
overview of the evidence on telephone access elasticities in North America and the
UK. Section 3 describes our modelling approach and the data used. Section 4 outlines
the pseudo-panel econometric technique. In section 5 we summarize and assess the
empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Review of the Evidence
2.1 North America
One of the main sources of information on telephone demand is Taylor’s (1980 and
1994) survey of the theoretical and empirical literature. Taylor notes that the erosion
of the internal cross-subsidies in the telecoms industry meant that US research in the
21980’s has seen an increase in the number of studies on the demand for residential
access. The literature on access remains meagre, however, compared to that on call
demand. One of the main reasons for this limited evidence stems from the fact that
historically the US market has been characterized by local calls and access being
bundled together1. Consequently much of the literature analyses this bundled service
and not access as a separate service. The empirical debate in the US has centered
around the question of whether or not elasticities are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Taylor (1994) reports of only eight studies which had been published on telephone
access pre-1980. Five of these use aggregate time-series data2. The remaining three
use cross-section data, but only Perl (1978) estimates a model based on household
data3. Taylor(1994) summarizes the evidence on access by giving a range for the basic
service charge elasticity of -0.06 to -0.17, with a mean of around -0.1. Considerably
smaller …gures are quoted for the initial connection charge (-0.02 to -0.04). Income
elasticities were centered around 0.5. Taylor suggests that residential access price
elasticities have fallen somewhat during the 1980’s due to higher penetration rates.
Overall Taylor concludes that: “a very small price elasticity and a moderate, but
yet decidedly inelastic income elasticity is precisely what one should expect for basic
telephone service: access to the telephone system is not a plaything of the rich....but
has become a basic necessity for virtually all income groups.” (Taylor, 1994, p279).
The small, but nevertheless nonzero, access elasticities obtained pre-1980 have
been con…rmed and sharpened in the 1980’s. See for instance Perl (1983) , Taylor
and Kirdel (1990), and Cain and Macdonald (1991). More recently, a number of
applied studies using increasingly sophisticated quantal choice models have allowed
for the fact that today residential users in the US face a multiple tari¤ choice for
telephone access. Studies analyzing access elasticities in the context of multiple tari¤
options include Kirdel (1988) , Kirdel and Taylor (1993), Train, McFadden and Ben-
Akiva (1987), Train, Ben-Akiva and Atherton (1989) and Train (1994).
Fromaccess demand studiesforthe US, theconsensusemerges that the probability
of having a telephone is sensitive to price, but the sensitivity is quantitatively small
in aggregated terms. However, early on, Perl (1978) found that access elasticities
are sensitive to the level of household income. This result has been con…rmed in
subsequent studies. Cain and Macdonald (1991) focus on this particular aspect and
…nd that some elasticities are up to twice as high for the poorest income households.
Households most vulnerable to drop-o¤ due to rising local rates are young, low-
income, poorly educated households living in rural areas.
1In the case of bundled local service, a unique …xed rental charge includes an unlimited number
of local calls. Measured local service was gradually introduced throughout the US in the 1980s.
2The …ve time-series studies mentioned by Taylor are Rash (1971); Davis et al. (1973); Waverman
(1974); Pousette (1976); and Southern New England Telephone Co. (1977). Waverman and Pousette
use the only European, namely Swedish, data.
3The three studies are Alleman (1977) who uses data on a city level, Feldman (1976) who uses
data on state level, and Perl (1978) who uses 1970 Census data.
32.2 United Kingdom
There is little formal work on access demand in the UK. British Telecom (BT) has
conducted a number of studies on telephone demand, the results of which have been
published in Cracknell (1982 and 1988), Cracknell and White (1989), and Cracknell
and Knott (1995). The models yield estimates of the income and price elasticities
for di¤erent services, mainly with the aim of improving commercial prediction and
assessment of marketing strategies. This focus makes it more di¢cult to achieve a
meaningful direct comparison with other studies in the …eld.
BT’s statistics of residential system growth separately identify demand for new
exchange lines, cessations and takeovers of existing lines and therefore allow a more
detailed analysis of access behaviour (Cracknell, 1988). A working line was left for
take-over in 84 percent of houses where the previous occupant had moved out. 92
percent of these takeover o¤ers where taken up by the new occupant. Even among
previously untelephoned households take-up was 85 percent. These rates are much
higher than the 7 percent of non-movers who joined the network. The statistics show
that, in the UK, household mobility provides a substantial impetus to the expansion
of the telephone network, while the popularity of taking over service con…rms evidence
that installation charges can be a powerful deterrent. Analysis of cross-section take-
up rates at di¤erent prices for di¤erent customer groups (e.g. new customers, moved
customers, or take-up) gives an implied price elasticity of the order of -0.85 (Cracknell
1988 )4.
BT has also undertaken market research into the reasons for residential cessations
(Cracknell and White, 1989). For a sample of 450 household in which there had been
a change of telephone service in the previous year, 25 percent were customers who
had not moved and had ceased their lines. In 7 percent of cases, service was subse-
quently reprovided to the same number. The majority of disconnections are due to
conversion of premises, demolition or delay in re-occupation. A demographic analysis
of the non-moving ceasers showed that they tend to be younger households, who are
either in unskilled manual work or unemployed with recently born children, living
in council accommodation. In a cross-section analysis based on BT’s market panel,
income proved the most powerful variable to explain residential system growth with
a cross-section elasticity of 0.47. Other signi…cant correlations were found between
penetration rate and household size, rural versus inner city location, employment
status, and number of rooms occupied (a measure of household wealth). Type of
tenancy was not found to be a signi…cant in‡uence. A (non-signi…cant) price elastic-
ity of -0.063 with respect to the annual rental charge was established by a BT study
quoted in Cracknell and White (1989).
4This result is so much higher than others reviewed so far because the price range considered
is very di¤erent: the connection charge for a new customer is GBP105, while take-ever only costs
GBP16 (Cracknell, 1988, presumably 1987 prices excl.VAT). Other access studies only consider the
variation in the connection charge for new customers.
4In an empirical study based on data from the telephone system in Hull (UK)5,
Trotter (1989 and 1996) produces separate demand estimates for access, local and
trunk call prices. The focus of his access demand estimation is for access on a particu-
lartari¤, ratherthan for accessas a whole. This is due to the fact that the Hull system
has had multi-tari¤ characteristics during a long period and there is thus no single
access charge. Trotter uses aggregate time-series data covering the period 1974/75 to
1986/87. The price variables are complemented by aggregate measures of GDP and
variables linked to alternative tari¤ choices (essentially rentals of alternative options
available to residential users).
When analyzing the main residential tari¤, Trotter (1996) …nds that neither levels
nor changes in rentals seem to play a meaningful role in explaining the number of
customers on the main residential tari¤. Nor does the connection charge. This may
be because it was relatively stable over the period or because it is lower than the
BT equivalent. The lagged number of customers on the tari¤ is highly explanatory.
However, this is to be expected considering the strong time trend present in the
telephone penetration variable. Because of the small number of observations, the
results are not very stable. Nevertheless, Trotter reports a short-run access elasticity
of 0.6 with respect to income and of -0.1 with respect to the rental charge of the main
residential tari¤.
Summing up, some general conclusions appear to hold for North America and
the UK. Price elasticities for telephone services are small but greater than zero and
increase with distance, with access being the smallest in absolute terms and interna-
tional calls the largest. The assessment of access elasticities and the comparison of US
and UK evidence is, however, less than straightforward. Many of the US studies refer
to basic local service, i.e. bundled local access and local calls, whereas UK studies are
rare and mostly based on time series. Reported rental elasticities (“basic local ser-
vice”) have an average size of -0.1 in the US, their UK counterpart (line rental only)
ranges between -0.06 and -0.1. Income elasticities of access center around 0.5 for the
US, and vary between 0.5 and 0.6 in the UK. For connection charges, US elasticity
estimates are in the range of -0.02 to -0.04, for the UK only Cracknell (1988) gives an
estimation of a connection charge elasticity which is -0.85. Unfortunately, the method
used in calculating this last number di¤ers too much from the other estimates to allow
any direct comparison. Overall, we believe that, despite the similarities in the size of
the estimates, a comparison across the Atlantic needs to be done with caution. The
di¤erences in the respective telecoms environments have to be taken into account, as
have the di¤erent de…nitions for various services. Cracknell and Knott (1995) stress
the sensitivity of elasticity calculations with respect to the underlying data. How-
ever, the similarity in the range of the results across the Atlantic is notable. The
5Kingston Communications (Hull) plc is a telecommunications company wholly owned by
Kingston-upon-Hull City Council. It holds a licence under the 1984 Telecommunications Act to
provide all telecommunications network services in the Hull licensed area. This area has a popula-
tion of around 350 000 people serviced by some 150 000 exchange connections.
5socio-demographic variables playing a role in determining access include income, age,
education and employment status on both sides of the Atlantic.
3 Model and Data
3.1 Model
One of the most important features of telecommunications demand is the interdepen-
dence between telephone access and telephone usage. Access refers to the consumer’s
ability to make and receive6 telephone calls, and logically precedes usage, which refers
to calls actually made. Making a telephone call is dependent on a prior decision to
subscribe to the telephone network. However, telephone access does not automat-
ically imply usage. Due to option demand, a consumer may desire to have access
even though no calls are made. Option demand refers to the bene…ts that come from
being able to make and receive calls which are not in fact made or received. The
most quoted example is the ability to call medical or rescue services in an emergency.
It is easy to imagine that consumers are willing to pay for this bene…t separately.
The theoretical basis for most access demand studies is the consumer surplus
framework, in which the demand for access to a telephone network is related to the
net bene…t from usage of the network, as measured by consumer surplus. Households
will decide to have a telephone if the value of consumer surplus from using a telephone
exceedsthe price of access. Wenders(1987)arguesthatthe consumersurplusobtained
from the surface area below the call demand curve should be augmented by the value
to the consumer of receiving incoming calls, plus the “option value” of being able to
make or receive further calls if she wishes.
The consumer surplusframework easily lends itself to the formulation of a quantal-
choice model by viewing consumer surplus as a random variable whose mean is related
to prices, income and other relevant socio-demographic variables. A normal distribu-
tion leads to the probit model, while a logistic distribution leads to the logit model.
Probit/logit models can alternatively be derived in a random utility framework, as in,
for example, the models of Train, McFadden and Ben-Akiva (1987) and Train (1994)
.
Taylor draws on previous work by several authors to derive a cohesive theoretical
structure to model telephone demand. The key elements of his discussion are outlined
here7.
We assume the individual maximizes a utility function
U = u(±q;x;±N) (1)
6Note that the distinction between making and receiving calls is increasingly important in the
face of regulatory tendencies emerging at present. Disconnection from the telephone service is
replaced by a policy of barring outgoing calls due to concerns about universal service.
7See Taylor 1994 , pp23-35, for full details.
6where
± = 1 if the consumer is connected to the telephone system, 0 if not;
q = the number of telephone calls;
x = consumption of composite good;
N = number of subscribers to the system;
subject to a budget constraint
±(r + ¼q) + px = ¹ (2)
where
¼ = price of a call;
p = price of a composite good x;
r = price of access to the system8;
¹ = income of the consumer.
The demand functions are derived by a two-step procedure: maximisation of (1)
subject to (2) assuming ± = 1, and comparison of the resulting consumer’s surplus
with that if ± = 0. The …rst step leads to the following expression for the consumer’s




g(q;p;N;¹ ¡ r)dq ¡ ¼q
0 (3)
In step two these bene…ts are compared with the cost of access to the system, and
the consumer will subscribe if the former exceeds the latter:
± =
(
1 if S ¸ r
0 if S < r
The analysis is then extended to an entire population. The demand for use is now
identi…ed with the total number of calls, Q, whereas the demand for access is equated
with the proportion of the total population that subscribes to the telephone system.
Q is given by
Q = Q(¼;p;r;N;Y ) (4)





8The price of access to the system is the non-tra¢c sensitive part of the cost of being connected
to the telephone network. It is mostly twofold. First, there is a unique connection (or installation)
charge to be paid the moment access to the network is desired, then a line rental charge has to be
paid with every bill.
7The quantity that we wish to explain is the proportion of the population which
does subscribe, N=M, where M is the total population.





gn(q;p;N;¹n ¡ r)dq ¡ ¼q
0
n (6)
Each individual will again compare his or her value of Sn with r. ±n will vary
across individual consumers because of di¤erences in either tastes or income. Taylor
assumes that all consumers have the same preferences, so that it is income that
varies. More precisely, given a distribution of income, N will be determined by the
probability that Sn is greater than r:





where f(Sn) and F(Sn) are the density and distribution functions of Sn. The
distribution of Sn will be related to that of income via the ”change of variable” from


















More generally (5) can be rewritten as
N
M
= ©(¼;p;r;N;Y ) (10)
where ©(:) is a composite function embodying Sn, the change in variable from f to
h, and the integral in (9). Taylor concludes that equations (4) and (10) “comprise, in
general form, a bare-bones model of telephone demand for a population of residential
consumers” (Taylor 1994, p31).
8The presence of N as an argument in both these equations brings out the second
feature mentioned above, the role of externalities. These are of two types. One is
the call externality, by which one person making a call a¤ects (normally positively)
the utility of the person being called. In general this is assumed to be internalised
between the two bene…ciaries. The other externality concerns access, and derives
from the extra utility accruing to one subscriber if the number of other subscribers in
the system increases. Its e¤ect will be to reinforce the access-usage interdependence.
The practical consequence is that we would expect demand to be more than unit
elastic with respect to the number of customers on the system. Taylor (1980, p16)
argues “it [the access externality] gives the telephone the dimension of a public good,
since the bene…t that a new subscriber confers on existing subscribers is shared in
common.” This argument has been used to support the case for subsidizing access,
as the bene…t as perceived by the individual subscriber will tend to understate the
total bene…t to society.
3.2 Data
The data set we use is based on 12 years of the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
spanning the period from 1985 to 1996. The FES is a continuous household survey
that generates random samples of the population every year9. 10,000 UK households
are selected every year. Of these approximately 7,000 complete the survey procedure
and are included in the data set. Thus, our original sample comprises some 92,000
UK households. The sample period chosen avoids complications with respect to
structural changes in the UK telephone industry, as 1984 is the year British Telecom
was privatized. Moreover, price data becomes very di¢cult to trace for the pre-1984
period.
Beside very detailed information on expenditure on consumption and investment
goods, the FES provides data on household characteristics. The socio-demographic
information we use, such as education or sex, refers to the head of household. Other
variables, such as income, refer to the household as a unit. In contrast to the US
census survey, the FES does not comprise any information about the ethnic origin or
thenativelanguageofthehousehold, twovariableswhich havebeen used in US studies
on telephone demand to account for the size of the “calling circle” of a household. The
FES survey includes a question about telephone access with the wording: “Is there a
telephone installed in your accommodation?”. We coded the answer in a binary 0-1
mode. Telephone access in this model is therefore de…ned in terms of access within
the home.
9We are grateful to the ESRC Data Archive in Essex for providing us with the FES data.
94 Method of Estimation
The key di¤erence between the US and the UK in terms of modelling telephone de-
mand stems from the di¤erent organizational structure of the industry in the two
countries. US studies are mainly based on countrywide census data. See, for exam-
ple, Perl (1983), Cain and Macdonald (1991) , or Taylor and Kirdel (1990). Due to
the presence of a multitude of telephone operators created after the divestiture of
AT&T in 198410, di¤erent prices for telephone access and call services are charged in
di¤erent regions and cities of the US at any given moment. Therefore, a single coun-
trywide US data set comprises not only variation in socio-demographic variables, but
also variation in price variables. By contrast, most European countries, including the
UK, have a long history of monopoly provision accompanied by a policy of uniform
pricing at the national level. Even after the liberalisation of the UK telecommunica-
tions market in 1984, British Telecom retains almost the entire market of residential
access11. For this reason, there is still predominantly a unique price for telephone
connection and quarterly line rental. Because of this market structure, price varia-
tion necessary to estimate the access elasticities of telephone demand is only available
across time. Thus, a unique cross-section data set such as generated by one set of
census data will not provide the necessary price dimension for our analysis. To rem-
edy this problem, we base our study on a combined time series/cross-section data set.
In this way, a simultaneous analysis of the in‡uence of socio-demographic and price
variables is possible.
We compile 12 years of the UK FES data to estimate the model outlined in the
previous section and to …nd empirical values for the price and income elasticities of
telephone access. In order to consistently estimate a model based on data generated
by repeated and independent cross-sections, econometric techniques adapted to this
data structure have to be employed. In his seminal article, Deaton (1985) shows
that a …xed e¤ect model can be identi…ed and consistently estimated from repeated
cross-section (RCS) data. He suggests grouping individuals sharing some common
observed characteristics, like age or sex, into cohorts. The averages within these co-
horts are then treated as observations in a pseudo-panel (or synthetic panel, Verbeek,
1992) to which standard techniques for panel data estimation can be applied. Such
synthetic panels might even have certain advantages over pure panel data, notably
the preservation of randomness due to the absence of attrition.
10Known as Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).
11At the same time, the more lucrative corporate and long-distance call market has become
increasingly competitive. Also, this assessment of BT’s share of the residential access market is
valid for the sample period used, i.e. 1985-1996. At the moment of the publication of this paper,
cable companies are busy eroding BT’s share in the residential market, a phenomenon which would
have to be taken into account in future analysis.
104.1 Pseudo Panel Estimation
Suppose that yit is a 0 ¡ 1 variable indicating whether a household has access to a
telephone or not, and that this indicator variable is a linear function of explanatory
variables. We acknowledge this being an unusual assumption as in reality it is not
possible for a 0 ¡ 1 indicator to be a linear function of variables, since the linear
function can take any value whereas the indicator is binary. However, the estimation
procedure which we have adopted involves subsequent aggregation of the individual
data. We need yit to be linear in the explanatory vriables in order for the aggrega-
tion to give a relation between the share of 1’s and the average of the explanatory
variables12.
Consider now the basic linear individual e¤ect model
yit = ®i + Xit¯ + uit i = 1;:::N; t = 1;:::T (11)
where Xit is a (K £ 1) vector of explanatory variables which we assume exogenous
to the model, index t and i refer to time and individuals respectively. Note that as
we are not dealing with a real panel, N can vary from period to period while T is
…xed. The disturbances of the model (11) are assumed to be i.i.d., with zero mean
and variance ¾2
u. We also assume that the individual e¤ects ®i are i.i.d. with …nite
mean and variance ¾2
®. If the ®i’s are assumed to be the same across all units,
OLS provides consistent estimators of ® and ¯: Complications arise from the fact
that the individual e¤ects are assumed to be uncorrelated with the disturbances but
potentially correlated with the regressors. If the individual e¤ects are uncorrelated
with the explanatory variables Xit, the model can easily be estimated from RCS
by pooling all observations and performing OLS treating ®i + uit as a composite
error term. However, in many applications the individual e¤ects ®i are likely to be
correlated with Xit , so that estimation procedures treatingthe ®i as random drawings
from some distribution, such as simple pooling or the random e¤ects model, lead to
inconsistent estimators, unless the correlation is explicitly taken into account. When
panel data are available, this problem can be solved by treating the ®i as unknown,
but estimable, parameters. Obviously this strategy no longer applies if no repeated
observations on the same individuals are available. When the model is to be identi…ed
by means of RCS data, an additional incidental parameter problem arises: NT + K
parameters have to be estimated from NT observations. Deaton (1985) suggests the
use of cohorts to obtain consistent estimators for ¯ in (11) if repeated cross-sections
are available and the individual e¤ects are correlated with the regressors.
De…ne C cohorts, which are groups of individuals sharing some common charac-
teristics like sex or date of birth. These groups are de…ned in such a manner that each
individual is a member of exactly one cohort, and remains a member of this cohort
for all periods. For example, a particular cohort may consist of all male individuals
12We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this problem of an aggregation bias
created by the estimation method.
11born in 1945-1949. Assuming, for simplicity, that there is a unique regressor (K = 1),
if we aggregate all observations to cohort level, the resulting model can be written as
¹ yct = ¹ ®ct + ¯ ¹ xct + ¹ uct c = 1;:::C (12)






average value of all observed xit’s in cohort c at time t, and analogously for the
other variables in the model. The resulting data set is a pseudo panel with repeated
observations over T periods and C cohorts. The main problem with estimating (12)
is that ¹ ®ct depends on t; is unobserved and is still likely to be correlated with ¹ xct.
Therefore, treating ¹ ®ct as random error is likely to lead to inconsistent estimators,
while treating them as …xed unknown parameters results in an identi…cation problem
unless the variations over t can be ignored ( ¹ ®ct = ¹ ®c). If the cohort averages are based
on a large number of individual observations, this assumption seems reasonable (see
for instance Verbeek and Nijman, 1992, on the asymptotic properties of the cohort
estimators). Under these assumptions, a natural estimator for ¯ is the covariance, or
within, estimator ^ ¯w used on the weighted cohort means13.








¹ xctnct be the time average of the observed cohort means
for cohort c, and de…ne ¹ yc likewise. The weighted within estimator on the pseudo
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(13)
^ ¯w is biased in small samples but consistent as the size of each group nct tends to
in…nity, provided standard assumptions on the second moments of the regressors hold
(Mo¢tt, 1993). When the size of each cohort is large enough, the sample mean of the
…xed e¤ects providesa consistent estimatorof the time-invariant population mean and
the estimator given in (13) is consistent. Consequently, when nc is reasonably large,
most applied studies ignore the errors-in-variables problem caused by the possible
time variation in ¹ ®ct and use standard estimators like the within estimator. See for
example Browning et al.(1985). Our study falls into this category as the average
cohort size for our sample is su¢ciently large.
Note also that there is a trade-o¤ between the number of observations in the
pseudo panel and the accuracy of these observations. The larger nc , the smaller C.
In the case of the standard within estimator ^ ¯w , this means a trade-o¤ between the
bias and variance of the estimator.
13The weights are introduced to account for heteroscedasticity across cohorts.
125 Empirical Results
We model the demand for telephone access as a function of two groups of variables:
price variablesand socio-demographic variables. These variablesdetermine the calling
pattern of the household and therefore its access demand. The model we specify
seeks to explain telephone access as a function of real connection charges and real
line rental, which we expect to have a negative impact on telephone access, as well
as real net household income, which has an expected positive in‡uence. We also
introduce household income in squared form to account for possible non-linearities.
The total number of household members is equally expected to increase the demand
for telephone usage and therefore for telephone access. In addition, we introduce
measures for retired and female heads of household. Socio-economic studies about
the “untelephoned” (see for instance OFTEL, 1994) …nd that these groups are more
likely to be connected to the telephone, possibly re‡ecting higher option demand.
We include the presence of children under …ve partly to adjust the household size
variable for structural di¤erences in household composition, and partly to test for
another possible option demand e¤ect.
Other household characteristics included are variables denoting a single-person
household, the presence of an unemployed/unoccupied head of household, the age at
which the head of household left full-time education, moreover a variable indicating
rented accommodation, a “recent mover” variable, and …nally a variable which de-
notes an area with low population density. Single household status has been found
to have a negative impact on telephone access in studies in the United States. The
presence of an unemployed or unoccupied head of household is included to test for
an in‡uence beyond the income e¤ect. The age at which the head of household left
full-time education should in‡uence the demand for telephone access positively. As
far as variables related to the household accommodation are concerned, we expect
households living in rented accommodation to have a lower access demand because of
the type of housing included in this category. It has also been argued that the calling
circle of households living in rented accommodation is smaller than for households
owning their accommodation (Cain and Macdonald, 1991). The recent mover vari-
able has been included to account for households not yet having had the time to get
connected to the telephone. The …nal explanatory variable denotes households living
in administrative areas with under 3.2 persons per acre (7.9 persons per hectar) and
is included to account for spacial patterns in the telephone penetration rate.
For the estimation of our model, we divide the individual households into groups
based on the date of birth of theheadof household. Weinclude householdswhose head
was born between 1910and 1963, that is, headsof household who were between 22 and
74 years old in 1985, the initial year of our sample. To form the pseudo-panel cohorts,
we regroup the date of birth groups into pairs. Thus, the …rst cohort comprises
households whose head was born in 1910 or 1911, the second households whose head
was born in 1912 or 1913, and so on. This guarantees a su¢ciently large number of
13Real Connection Charges (top)

















Figure 1: BT connection charges and annual line rental
observations in each cohort. In this manner, we create a pseudo-panel comprising 27
cohorts over 12 years, i.e. a sample with 324 observations overall. Our mean cohort
size is 226. The total number of households forming the basis of the overall cohort
sample is approximately 73,300. Note that while the original model as de…ned in
theoretical terms in (11) is a binary model in the dependent variable and in a number
of the explanatory variables, once the cohorts are formed, the observations take on
the value of cohort means and represent proportions. The binary variable indicating a
female head of household, for example, is now the proportion of households headed by
a woman for a given cohort at a given time. We perform a logarithmic transformation
on the dependent variable to make sure that the proportion estimated is bound by the
[0,1] interval. The price variables included in the model are the connection charge BT
charges new customers as well as BT’s annual line rental charge14. The connection
charge varied between £77.5 and £121 in real terms (1987 prices) between 1985 and
1996, the real annual line rental between £54 and £80. The evolution of the two access
prices over time can be seen in Figure 1. The annual mean telephone penetration
rate calculated from our sample over the same time period is pictured in Figure 2.
We estimate the model by means of the weighted within estimator given in (13).
The results of the estimation are reported in the second column of Table 1. Given
the original form of the data, namely random samples taken from a large population,
we have undertaken a Hausman test to test the speci…cation of the model as …xed
rather than random e¤ect model. The null hypothesis of orthogonality of the ®i and
Xit is rejected and the …xed e¤ect speci…cation is therefore accepted as appropriate.
14We are grateful to Eurodata, London, for providing us with the telephone price data used in
this article.
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Figure 2: Telephone penetration rates
Table 1: Estimation Results
Indep. Variable¤ Coe¢cients (t-stat. in parentheses)
Overall Sample Low-Educ.Sample
connection charge -0.0056 (-5.01) -0.0062 (-4.64)
rental charge -0.0043 (-1.67) -0.0067 (-2.3)
household income 0.006 (4.32) 0.0065 (3.68)
household income2 -9.06e-07 (-2.39) -1.03e-06 (-1.99)
retired HoH 1.27 (5.03) 1.12 (4.17)
female HoH 3.03 (5.00) 2.49 (4.63)
rented accomod. -4.46 (-8.32) -3.24 (-7.35)
person total in HH -0.013 (-0.125) -0.02 (-0.17)
%age of child. <5 -0.574 (-0.585) -2.24 (-2.1)
unem./unocc.HoH 0.87 (1.75) 0.66 (1.41)
single person HH -0.774 (-1.24) -0.21 (-0.35)
left f-t education 0.283 (3.5) 0.33 (2.72)
recent mover -3.69 (-3.39) -1.79 (-1.66)
area density 0.89 (2.05) 0.34 (0.834)
const. -2.92 (-2.16) -3.2 (-1.8)
F-Test 1.31 1.21




mean cohort size 226 129
¤HoH = head of household, HH= household 15The coe¢cients of household income and the connection charge have the expected
sign and are statistically highly signi…cant. The coe¢cient of the annual rental charge
is negative, and while the statistical signi…cance level for this price variable is lower, it
is still within the 10 percent con…dence interval. The small but negative coe¢cients
for the two price variables con…rm the deterrent represented by telephone access
charges. Calculated at the sample mean, the coe¢cient for the connection charge
gives rise to an access elasticity of -0.065 which lies above the range of connection
charge elasticities reviewed by Taylor (1980) (-0.02 to -0.04), but within the results
quoted by Cain and McDonald (1991). The coe¢cient for annual line rental in turn
suggests an elasticity measure of -0.033 which is lower than the results reviewed
earlier in this article. Our results suggest that it is primarily the connection charge
which represents a barrier to telephone ownership. This argument is supported by
the …ndings of the 1994 OFTEL report on the untelephoned. For household income,
the coe¢cient leads to an income elasticity of 0.14, which is lower than the average
results reported earlier. However, our result is in line with the …ndings of Waverman
(1974) and Perl (1976). In both cases the estimate of the income elasticity is 0.15
(Taylor, 1994, p279). Like Perl’s, our elasticity is estimated with a model in which
other factors related to income, such as education or type of housing, are taken into
account. Thus a smaller income elasticity is probably to be expected. The signi…cant
coe¢cient of the squared income variable suggests that there might be a non-linear
e¤ect in this variable.
A majority of the socio-demographic variables included as explanatory variables
for access demand have signi…cant coe¢cients. Households headed by someone with
higher education level are more likely to have a telephone in their living quarters, as
are households headed by a retired or female person. This seems to suggest a higher
option demand for this population group. However, other variables included to ac-
count for household structure, such as household size or the percentage of children
under …ve, do not seem to have a statistically signi…cant impact on telephone access
demand. Neither does the single person household status. A household headed by
a unemployed person or one without occupation has a positive coe¢cient indicat-
ing a higher probability of telephone access for this population group. This result
might partly be due to the de…nition of this category. In particular the latter group
included in the category unemployed/unoccupied might contain households with a
high propensity for telephone access. There may also be an e¤ect due to a social
security system which accords allowances for utility bills. Living in rented accommo-
dation in‡uences telephone access negatively, which is to be expected as most of the
dwellings included in the category “rented accommodation” in the UK are council
housing or belong to housing associations. Households living in rented accommoda-
tion are therefore likely to have a lower than average income. Having recently moved
to the current address has a statistically strong e¤ect and diminishes the probability
of the household being connected to the telephone. Living in an area with very low
population density also leads to a higher demand for telephone access as could be ex-
16pected given the higher cost of alternative means of communication, such as personal
visits, for households living in remote areas.
Overall, it is income and variables related to income such as education or type of
housing, together with variables indicating female or retired heads of household which
have the strongest impact on telephone access among the socio-economic variables.
This result corroborates the …ndings of the main US studies surveyed in Section 2.
A “recent mover e¤ect” can also be clearly identi…ed.
5.1 Di¤erentiation of the results according to income
Progress toward universal service is generally measured by the percentage of house-
holds with telephone service. Despite a high aggregate level of the household pene-
tration rate, an important di¤erential between population groups exists. Cain and
Macdonald (1991) …nd that price elasticities di¤er substantially between low and high
income groups. The impact of higher …xed charges will therefore be born dispropor-
tionately by the low-income part of the population. The (arc) price elasticities for
connection charges calculated by Cain and Macdonald (1991) range from -0.04 to
-0.2 with greater elasticities in households with lower initial connection probability,
mainly low-income households from minority groups. In order to test the sensitivity
of the access elasticity with respect to income in our sample, we divide our data into
two subgroups. We create cohorts which are not only based on date of birth, but also
on the age at which the head of household left full-time education. This latter vari-
able serves as a time-invariant proxy for household income and allows us to partition
our sample according to a variable strongly correlated with income. We de…ne people
who left full-time education at or below the legal age as belonging to a “lower edu-
cation” group15. We then apply the pseudo-panel technique to the lower education
sample to test for di¤erences in the results for this subgroup. The estimation results
for the “lower-education” sample are reported in column 3 of Table 1.
The heads of roughly 42,000 households born between 1910 and 1963 left school
at or below the legal school leaving age. We regroup them into two-year cohorts
following the same procedure outlined above. The mean cohort size is 129. Column 3
shows us that the income and price variables have signi…cant coe¢cients which give
rise to elasticities of 0.176 for income and -0.1 and -0.07 for connection charge and
line rental respectively (all calculated at sample mean values). The price elasticities
in the lower-education population are therefore 50 percent and 100 percent higher
than the elasticities calculated for the overall population. We conclude that the lower
education/lower income group is indeed more sensitive to changes in telephone access
15We also need to account for the fact that the legal age for school leavers has changed over time.
Our sample includes individuals born between 1910 and 1963. While these were at school, the legal
age …rst changed from 14 to 15 (1946) and then from 15 to 16 (1973). A person born for instance
in 1930 is thus ”higher-educated” if they left school at 16, while another, born for instance in 1960,
is ”lower-educated” if they left school at the same age of 16.
17charges than the overall population. The income elasticity is also higher, although
its rise by 25 percent is not quite as marked as that of the price variable elasticities.
There is little change of behaviour among the socio-demographic variables. Retire-
ment, gender and education have a statistically signi…cant positive in‡uence on the
telephone penetration rate, while living in rented accommodation has a strong nega-
tive e¤ect. Household size is still statistically non-signi…cant, but our results suggest
that the number of children under …ve has a negative in‡uence on telephone access
among the lower-education population, whereas it did not have a signi…cant impact
in the overall sample. This result might be interpreted in terms of a liquidity e¤ect.
The presence of infants in low-income households might present a strain on household
income which can be seen in lower telephone access rates, a phenomenon which is
not apparent in the population at large. Moving into the present dwelling within
the last four months still has a negative sign but its signi…cance level has dropped.
Living in an area of under 3.2 persons per acre is no longer statistically signi…cant
for households in the lower-education sample.
5.2 Assessment of Results
The small but mostly signi…cant negative price elasticities for connection and rental
charges suggest that a substantial increase in these prices will have a noticeable
negative e¤ect on telephone penetration and therefore on the objective of achieving
universal access across all groups of the population. Small elasticities can lead to
large numbers when applied to a large population base16. The numbers give even
more cause to concern if they are higher for disadvantaged, low-income groups as
our results suggest. However, the elasticities calculated in this study should not be
used in an unconditional manner to quantify drop-o¤. First, adjustment to increasing
residential access charges will take place over time and not instantaneously. Second,
telephone penetration is driven by a host of factors other than price which might
evolve so as to counteract the e¤ect of rising price levels.
Telephone penetration rates in the UK have risen steadily since the 1984 liberali-
sation despite changes in connection and line rental charges. One possible explanation
is the change in the household structure during the same period. When focusing on
the household characteristics which we identi…ed as most in‡uential on telephone ac-
cess demand, we see that average weekly household income has increased from £183
to £213 (1987 prices) between 1985 and 1996, even though the growth of this variable
has slowed in the …rst half of the 1990s. Also according to the FES data, the propor-
tion of households headed by a retired or female person has increased over the same
16According to the 1991 population census there were 21 441 000 households in the UK at this
moment. The telephone penetration rate calculated from the FES survey for that year was 90.4%,
i.e. 19 383 000 households had in house access to the telephone. According to our elasticity
calculation and assuming ceteris paribus, a 25% increase in the connection charge would lead to a
1.625% decrease in the quantity of people connected, which would signify 315 000 households less
among those with telephone connection.
18time period. The former group’s share among total households has risen from 22 to 26
percent, the latter’s from 23 to 26 percent17. The average education level measured
by the age when full-time education ceased has risen from 15.5 to 16.1 years, in line
with the increase in the compulsory schooling age. At the same time the frequency
of rented accommodation decreased from 30.4 to 23.6 percent due to the government
sale of council housing to their respective occupiers. To the extent that households
with higher incomes, or headed by a retired person or a woman, as well as households
living in owned accommodation have a higher demand for telephone access, we will
expect rising telephone penetration as the household structure changes over time.
Is the evolution of factors in‡uencing telephone penetration in the overall popu-
lation mirrored in those parts of the population most likely not to have a telephone?
It is the lowest income groups which are most threatened by further marginalisation
due to increasing …xed charges. We select those households in the lowest ten percent
income percentile for each year in the sample to search for potential di¤erences in the
behaviour of the socio-demographic variables for this population group. The most
noteworthy di¤erence between the overall sample and the lowest ten percent income
group is the di¤erence in their respective age structures. The average age among the
lowest income populations is 60.7 years. This is ten years above the average age of
all heads of household included in the FES survey between 1985 and 1996. Over the
same period, the percentage of households headed by retired persons has risen from
41.6 to 57 percent, the proportion of those headed by women varied between 59 and
65 percent. For the greatest part the tendencies observed in the overall population
are however mirrored by the households in the lowest ten percent income bracket.
Average weekly household income has risen from £48 to £52.2 for this income group.
The average education level has also increased from 14.4 to 14.9 years. The percent-
age of households living in rented accommodation has decreased from 48.4 percent in
1988 to 35.7 percent in 1995.
In view of the evolution of the variables identi…ed in our model as in‡uencing
telephone access demand, we can …nd no evidence for the UK that there is an in-
crease in the probability of marginalisation for the poorest population group as far as
telephone access is concerned. This conclusion is con…rmed by Figure 3. It shows the
evolution of telephone penetration rates between 1985 and 1996 for the overall FES
population sample and for the lowest 10 percent income households in this sample.
The …gure suggests a narrowing of the gap between the two groups. This narrowing
appears to be mainly due to the increase in income and in the share of households
headed by elderly and women in this population group.
17There is an obvious overlap between the variables though.
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Figure 3: Telephone penetration rates di¤erentiated according to income
6 Concluding Remarks
The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector and the rebalancing of the tari¤
structure associated with it has raised questions about the impact the rise in access
charges will have on residential customers. The issue is of particular interest in view of
universal service objectives proclaimed at national and European level. Through the
creation of a repeated cross section data set based on the annual UK Family Expen-
diture Survey we were able to estimate the impact of tari¤ variations on residential
telephone access demand.
Our work shares one drawback with other studies in this area. Our elasticity
measures do not allow us to separate the impact on telephone penetration rates into
“drop-o¤” resulting from higher connection and rental charges, and failure to “drop-
in” by those still untelephoned. In view of this, our work is, however, useful in
establishing two facts. First, the cost of access expressed by connection and rental
charges has a negative e¤ect, albeit small, on the probability of a household having a
telephone. Second, we have identi…ed a number of socio-demographic and economic
household characteristics associated with telephone access.
By creating a subsample of low-education households to approximate low-income
households, we also …nd a strong sensitivity of access elasticities with respect to
income. Our study con…rms the validity of US experience for the UK. For the overall
sample, our price elasticity of -0.06 with respect to connection charges lies above
the average of price elasticities summarized by Taylor (1994) but is in line with
estimates found by Cain and Macdonald (1991). For the lower education sample,
the corresponding price elasticity is -0.1. As far as the impact of the rental charge
20is concerned, the results show a negative impact on telephone access, the statistical
signi…cance of the results is however lower for this price variable, suggesting that the
one-o¤ connection charge is the main price barrier to telephone ownership. For the
overall sample, we found a price elasticity with respect to the rental charge of -0.033.
The measure is statistically more stable for the low-education sample were it leads to
an elasticity of -0.07. The income elasticity of access is 0.14 for our overall sample.
This is lower than the average estimate of 0.5 reported in studies surveyed by Taylor
(1994), but in line with estimates reported by Waverman (1973) and Perl (1976).
The fact that our estimate is lower is very likely a consequence of the inclusion of
income related variables such as education or type of housing in our estimation model.
Taylor (1994) argues that elasticities decrease as the penetration rate increases. If
this argument holds for the UK, our results, based on the period 1985-1996, and very
similar to results found up to 20 years ago for the US, would suggest that overall the
absolute level of telephone access elasticities is higher in the UK than in the US.
Among the socio-demographic and economic household characteristics strongly
in‡uencing telephone access demand are household income and variables linked to
income such as education and type of dwelling. The presence of a retired or female
head of household also in‡uences telephone access positively and suggests a stronger
option demand for these population groups. We also found a clear “recent-mover”
e¤ect.
We can see from Figure 1 that after initial increases, BT’s connection charge
has fallen in real terms over the last few years, mainly because of the regulator’s
concern about disconnections. The negative price elasticities found in this study
con…rm that such regulatory e¤orts may help maintain and improve access levels.
Nonetheless we believe that containing the access price at a below-cost level for the
whole population is not necessary to improve telephone penetration among the low-
income population. An economically more e¢cient way is o¤ered by targeted subsidy
programs, which target lower access charges at those truly threatened by exclusion.
We believe that so far the potential of such pricing options has not been exploited
in a satisfactory manner in the UK18. Targeted subsidy programs can take one of
two forms: either they are based on some means-tested criteria (in some US states
for instance telephone connection is facilitated for recipients of food stamps), or they
take the form of optional (or self-selection) tari¤s. This latter category of targeted
subsidy programs has very desirable e¢ciency features. US results suggest that access
demand is primarily a function of minimum rather than average access charges (Cain
and Macdonald, 1991, and Train, 1994). This suggests that the provision of social
tari¤s can be expected to maintain relatively high levels of access demand even in the
face of overall access charge rises. Tari¤s with relatively low access but high usage
18The introduction of the ”Low-User Scheme” in 1984 by BT has not been very successful. This
tari¤ designed for the low-income customers has been critizised for o¤ering too little in terms of
…xed cost relief. If o¤ered no reduction of connection charges and had therefore only limited appeal
to those not yet connected.
21charges for instance should appeal to low user groups such as certain elderly or lone
parents which have a relatively small calling circle but a high option demand.
Finally, we note the following. In his 1994 survey of telephone demand, Taylor
observes that while liberalization and technical progress have improved the quality
of data on telephone demand, competition and privatisation has led to increased
di¢culties for researchers in obtaining access to data now considered commercially
sensitive. Trotter (1996) con…rms this point for the post-liberalization UK. He states
in his conclusion that UK work has been hampered by a relative lack of data, partly
due to technical reasons, and partly due to most of the UK market being supplied
by one monopoly supplier, which makes any cross-section analysis di¢cult. While we
tried to remedy the latter point in this article, we agree with the above observations.
There remains a need for further work as an input into UK policy decisions. More
detailed work is however likely to depend on the data being speci…cally collected, as
has been the case for several of the main US studies.
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